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
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REAPPRECIATION OF CLAUSEWITZ'S "ON WAR"

BY

KIM, HEE SANG

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<p>Despite appearances, On War is not a finished work. Clausewitz himself admitted, "The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. It will at least serve the whole by indicating the direction I meant to follow everywhere."</p> <p>Clausewitz said in a note found among his papers, "It was my ambition to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once</p>		

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by those who are interested in the subject." Clausewitz, a perfectionist, hoped to draft his thoughts first and then perfect the draft with more thinking. According to his note, dated 10 July 1827, "I regard the first six books, which are already in a clean copy, merely as a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more. The revision will bring out the two types of war with greater clarity at every point. All ideas will then become plainer, their general trend will be more clearly marked, their application shown in greater detail." If he had lived long enough to realize his ambition, the history of the world may have been changed somewhat.

Unfortunately, he who was a genius in the study of military theory, died suddenly of cholera at the age of 51, his remaining ambitions unaccomplished. This elaborate but unfinished work used to give readers confusion and difficulty in understanding because there are often differences in front and rear of the text. Besides, metaphysical and philosophical characteristics add to this feeling of confusion. A French scholar wrote of him as "the most German of Germans... In reading him one constantly has the feeling of being in a metaphysical fog."

Because Clausewitz was charmed with the philosophical methodology of German philosophers including Kant, he was considered to be hard to understand from a military point of view. Despite these drawbacks, this book is one of the most important and influential classics for those who study social sciences such as politics and economics, as well as for military thinkers. On War is a difficult book-one that seems to be more quoted than actually read." It also contains large sections-particularly those dealing with tactics-the value of which has been weakened by the passage of time. But "it is nevertheless the first study on war that truly grapples with the fundamentals of its subject and the first to evolve a pattern of thought adaptable to every stage of military history and practice." And many people have had sympathy with his realistic analysis of the entity of military problems. To social scientists, the study of the nature, influence and characteristics of Clausewitz's thought would be a valuable basic course.

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REAPPRECIATION OF CLAUSEWITZ'S "ON WAR"

- MILITARY ESSAY -

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by Kim, Hee Sang

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PREFACE

Despite appearances, On War is not a finished work.¹ Clausewitz himself admitted, "The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. It will at least serve the whole by indicating the direction I meant to follow everywhere."²

Clausewitz said in a note found among his papers, "It was my ambition to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject."³ Clausewitz, a perfectionist, hoped to draft his thoughts first and then perfect the draft with more thinking. According to his note, dated 10 July 1827, "I regard the first six books, which are already in a clean copy, merely as a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more. The revision will bring out the two types of war with greater clarity at every point. All ideas will then become plainer, their general trend will be more clearly marked, their application shown in greater detail."⁴ If he had lived long enough to realize his ambition, the history of the world may have been changed somewhat.

Unfortunately, he who was a genius in the study of military theory, died suddenly of cholera at the age of 51, his remaining ambitions unaccomplished. This elaborate but unfinished work used to give readers confusion and difficulty in understanding because there are often differences in front and rear of the text. Besides, metaphysical and

philosophical characteristics add to this feeling of confusion. A French scholar wrote of him as "the most German of Germans... In reading him one constantly has the feeling of being in a metaphysical fog."⁵

Because Clausewitz was charmed with the philosophical methodology of German philosophers including Kant, he was considered to be hard to understand from a military point of view. Despite these drawbacks, this book is one of the most important and influential classics for those who study social sciences such as politics and economics, as well as for military thinkers. On War is a difficult book-one that seems to be more quoted than actually read."⁶ It also contains large sections-particularly those dealing with tactics-the value of which has been weakened by the passage of time. But "it is nevertheless the first study on war that truly grapples with the fundamentals of its subject and the first to evolve a pattern of thought adaptable to every stage of military history and practice."⁷ And many people have had sympathy with his realistic analysis of the entity of military problems. To social scientists, the study of the nature, influence and characteristics of Clausewitz's thought would be a valuable basic course.

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF CLAUSEWITZ'S THOUGHTS

Clausewitz's thoughts have gained fame for their historical value since it is in his age that the feudal society under ancient regimes was transformed into a bourgeois society. Also, from a military perspective, Napoleon reflected Clausewitz's thoughts by directing the civil energy of the new society to the battle fields. Clausewitz poured ceaseless efforts toward arranging the nature and characteristics of his age and Napoleon's attainment with genuine insight and philosophical appreciation.

Clausewitz devoted himself to "the spirit of searching for the absolute" which prevailed under the particular situation of 'Dichter und Denker' in the Germany of the 18th century. "The spirit of searching for the absolute" rendered great influence upon the development of his realistic military philosophy about the study of the nature of war.⁸ What made him great was his superior capacity of harmonizing speculative philosophy with the sense of reality.

He emphasized that "analysis and observation, theory and experience must never disdain or exclude each other; on the contrary, they should support each other."⁹ "Years of thinking on war, much association with able men who knew war, and a good deal of personal experience with it, have left him with certain ideas and convictions, and these he has preferred to present in compressed form, like small nuggets of pure metal."¹⁰ Harmonizing his knowledge and experiences on war with philosophy is a characteristic of his analysis of war and underlies his success.

The most fundamental thing is, however, the background of that age which, in the middle of two eras, could be characterized as the most critical moment in human history.

The wars under the ancient regime mostly concerned interests between monarchs and, therefore, were of no concern to ordinary people. At that time, war had a special meaning because the army consisted of hired troops of the monarch. Since wars resulted from the interests of monarchs, the army defended their authority and property. Hence monarchs did not want their armies to be consumed heavily through fierce battles. For these reasons military operations were limited to small ones; accordingly, battles demanding large bloodshed did not happen.

The object of military operations was not to defeat the main force of enemy; but by elaborate maneuver to gain an advantageous position and thus obtain a profitable peace treaty. War was likened to a chess game played by generals using lines and angles. But at the end of the 18th century, the French Revolution brought about dramatic changes throughout all armies. It basically started from the revolutionary fever of identifying the nation with people. War could no longer be a private concern of a monarch alone, but became a mission of the people to defend their country against the enemy.

The national army, based on this new identification, rejected the philosophical basis of past war and suggested new possibilities.

First, a new concept of exhaustive battle was substituted for the past concept of elaborate maneuver. New warfare was not a fight between

monarchs; but, a struggle between peoples with hostile feelings.

To win this cruel fight, erasing resistance through complete destruction became necessary. For this reason, the annihilation concept of war, which gains victory through crushing down fighting the power of the enemy, was formed.

Second, since the French Revolutionary Government proclaimed its compulsory mobilization order in August 1793, a people's armament order, the construction of mass military forces became possible through the conscription system. Additionally, French military pioneers like Louvois, Vauban, Bourcet improved the organization, operation and administration of the mass army.¹¹

Finally, the national army kept morale and esprit de corps high enough to undergo hardship. Without the restraints shown in the past war, the mass army displayed positive and bold operations.

There are more characters to be mentioned. The philosophical assets of the national army not only secured Napoleon's military success but has become the basis of the military ideology of the modern army. Napoleon, whom Clausewitz called 'God of War', succeeded by his utmost utilization of revolutionary fever, rather than by his own ability.¹² Clausewitz fully understood the essence of the Napoleonic War and developed this understanding into a military theory. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini, another apostle of Napoleon, concentrated more on the operational analysis of the Napoleonic War than on philosophical interpretation.

CHAPTER II

THE SUMMARY OF CLAUSEWITZ'S THOUGHT

"On War", a definitive work of Clausewitz's military thoughts, was composed of eight books. Book one treated, 'the nature of war'; the second, 'the theory of war': the third, 'strategy in general'; the fourth, 'the engagement': and the fifth, 'military forces': the sixth 'defense'. The seventh and eighth book are tentative arguments about 'attack' and 'war plans'. In the subjects of 'engagement', 'military forces', 'defense' and 'attack', he described strategy, tactics and the reality of war which he himself had experienced. In view of modern times, it is too much of a classical and out-of-date study for us to accept without criticism.

Even though understanding of Clausewitz varies, the real value of his thought is found in Book One and Book Eight. He considered the former complete; and the latter conclusory. Viewed from this point, it is somewhat arguable to consider him an advocate of the absolute war theory which aims at the annihilation of enemy forces.

"The age of the French Revolution and of Napoleon was an era in which, in Clausewitz's own words, 'War itself, as it were, had been lecturing.' War had reappeared as a terrible act of violence, upsetting the territorial as well as the social order of Europe."¹³ Penetrating into this age, Clausewitz found that the essence of war should be violence. He predicted that war would pursue its absolute nature and was to continue

to the last degree of hostility, as war itself had become a national concern since the Napoleonic era.

Clausewitz thought that as inquiry and observation go together, so do concept and experience. The highest value of his thought lies in his dual understanding of war; the conceptional war and the real war. The conceptional war is the absolute war, or the perfect war. Clausewitz depicted that "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,"¹⁴ which comes from the nature of war itself. The important thing herewith is an act of force, that is, to force one's will by means of violence.

Thus he emphasizes that, even though war belongs to the field of social activity, it is only distinguishable from other activities due to its character of violence. In this case, the purpose of war is to disdain the enemy¹⁵ and the means to do so is to annihilate enemy forces and occupy territory. Since both sides have a similar purpose and means of war, hostilities reach the extremity. Violence prevails without restriction and hostilities grow beyond control.¹⁶ Both sides exert themselves to win and the result of the war would be total victory, thorough defeat or stalemate.

When war goes up to the highest the limits of violence, other values are overwhelmed by military object as the ultimate goal. Political object is not the exception. "The political end, Clausewitz said, is... no despotic legislator. It must be adapted to the nature of the means and consequently may often be totally changed... strategy in general and the commander in chief in particular may demand that the political

14. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, p.75.
15. Ibid., p.77. The followers, then that to overcome the enemy, or
disarm him-call it what you will-must always be the aim of warfare.
16. Ibid., pp.75-76.
17. Requoted from H. Rothfels, op. cit., p.105.
18. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, op. cit., p.77.
19. Refer to ibid., Chapter one.
20. Ibid., pp.86-87.
21. Ibid., p.87.
22. Ibid., p.128.
23. Requoted from H.Rothfels, op. cit., p.108.
24. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, op. cit., pp.87-88.
25. Ibid., pp. 479-483.
26. Ibid., p.185.
27. H. Rothfels, op. cit., p.93.
28. Hong-chul Kim, trans., On War, (Seoul: Samsung Press Center, 1982), p.23.
29. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, op. cit., p.70.
30. Ibid., p.228.
31. Ibid., p.259.
32. Ibid., p.260.
33. Hong-chul Kim, op. cit., p.23.
34. H. Rothfels, op. cit., p.93.
35. Ibid.
36. Michael Howard, "The influence of Clausewitz" in Michael Howard and
Peter Paret op. cit., p.41.

NOTES

1. Peter Paret, "The Genesis of On War." introductory essay in Michael Howard and Peter Paret ed. and trans. On War, Princeton University Press, (Princeton; 1976), p.3.
2. Michael Howard and Peter Paret ibid., p.70.
3. Bernard Brodie, "The continuing relevance on War," introductory essay, ibid., p.58.
4. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ibid., p.69.
5. Bernard Brodie, ibid., p.48.
6. H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz", in Edward M. Earle, (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), p.93,
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p.94-95.
9. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, op. cit., p.610.
10. Ibid., p.62.
11. Before the French Revolution, Marquis de Louvois established the chain of command by improving military discipline and emphasizing the common feature (he was Minister of War); Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban exploited way for making enlistmen to veteran combatant without long term training through the scientification of army; Pierre de Bourcet developed the way to use a grand army by suggesting the division system concept and establishing the general staff system.
12. H. Rothfels, op. cit., p.99.
13. Ibid., p.96.

understand the origin and basis of contemporary military theories. By understanding the essence of his military thoughts, we can improve our capacity of strategic thinking by Clausewitzian methodology and insight. It is a way for us to obtain inspiration and ideas to solve our security problems.

basic of Clausewitzian ideas was discarded by the successors of Schlieffen and the younger von Moltke. The Schlieffen plan, to be sure, had an enormous built-in defect of its own which was basically anti-Clausewitzian—that is, the requirement for the invasion of Belgium, which was bound to bring Britain into the war."⁴⁵ Despite these differences both sides expressed the essence of Clausewitz's thought. "On War" is such a work that it can be so utilized. Moreover, as Clausewitz recognized it is also an unfinished work.

Therefore, the real value of "On War" can be found in its ascription of European military theories up until then and in becoming the fountain of later military thought. As Anatol Rapoport had pointed out, "Clausewitz's absolute war is total war. The modern advocate of 'total war', e.g. the Nazis and some partisans of 'total victory' in the United States, explicitly included (and now include) civilian populations as military targets." This is a product of neo-Clausewitzian trends. Clausewitz has had immense influences on present military theories, even in the communist world.

The more important fact is that his thought, which includes not only real war but also the absolute war concept, casts its shadow and takes root extensively in the almost all contemporary military thought. In the communist world, even today the tradition of annihilation is firmly placed in their military thoughts.

It is not important for us to discuss whether Clausewitz was right or not; or whether the next generations will judge him well or not. What is more important is searching for the essence of Clausewitz's thoughts and interpreting them exactly. Examining his thoughts enables us to

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

When we study a classic of social sciences, we have doubt as to whether the classic can survive future generations. Some disregard it such as a mere scrap of paper, while others respect it absolutely as if it must be eternal truth.

It seems that those who study Clausewitz-regardless of whether they are admirers or critics-like to take the latter position. Usually the critics like to condemn him as if the appearance of the annihilation phase had been just originated by him, and attribute to him, disasters such as mass mobilization, extreme carnage, and the doubled destruction in two world war. On the contrary, admirers exaggerate him as the greatest thinker who made immeasurable contributions to military affairs.

However, from Clausewitz's standpoint, it is unfair to condemn him as the symbol of humankind's disaster. Also it may prick his conscience for him to be called a great contributor to humanity. War of annihilation was not a creation of Clausewitz. It originated from the age of national wars. Clausewitz only rearranged it with a form of relationship between war and politics by analysing its nature.

Nonetheless assessment of Clausewitz is extremely varied by subjectires views of the appraisers. For example, with regard to the Schlieffen plan of the First World War, some insist that "Moltke and Schlieffen designed the German military policy on the basis of the Clausewitzian idea."⁴⁴ Others say that "unfortunately for Germany and for the world, the most

which demands decisive and rapid mobile operations, such judgement is but nonsense. Nevertheless the influence of Clausewitz's thought is still felt in military affairs. Especially, it is different from such like 'unchanging principles of war' of Jomini's concept directly concern on more fundamental features of war.

Clausewitz's dual concept of war and the understanding of war as violence serves his inquiry into the nature of war as ever. That war is a continuation of politics through another means is still adaptable to contemporary warfare. He wrote, "The best strategy is always to be very strong, first in general, and then at the decisive point... . There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated."⁴³ This statement tacitly denies any criticism.

Contemporary war, especially in the Western world, has often resulted in tragedy due to a hasty passion for peace and being controlled politically by irresponsible masses. It has often ended in disaster as compared with a war controlled by a great general.

Besides the above, Clausewitz's emphasis on morale has perpetual value. He distinguished hired troops from a national army in terms of morale. On the value of morale, nobody could use a more suitable expression than "physical forces are the wooden hilt, but moral forces are the shining blade of the sword."

nations participating war. This has been shown vividly through the Korean War and Middle East Wars. Nowadays, war available as 'a tool for political and psychological aim' is confined to revolutionary war. Few have thought of this kind of noncombatant war, which is preponderantly political and psychological. Clausewitz covered guerrilla warfare; but this only included means of revolutionary war, excepting the nature of revolutionary war.

Clausewitz's thought accordingly seem to lose the ground for their existence. Actually, the absolute authority of Clausewitz's thoughts has become confined by changes of situation.

Contemporary warfare, which requires both high mobility and extreme attritions at the same time, and international politics which absolutely demands 'cease-fire first and negotiations next' under the threat of nuclear war, have brought about the inevitability of a quick solution to local war. In these circumstances, absolute war which premises limitless violence using all reasons is no longer conceivable. The first lesson from Middle East War especially from Six Days War is that contemporary war is not a bloody and limitless struggle; but it is an act of paralysing enemy forces through mobile operations.

Clausewitz emphasized defense rather than attack. He did not show much concern about strategic military surprise. He thought that defense is the stronger form of warfare. This way of thinking is more or less understandable in view of his concept on absolute war which premises total war. But it is common sense in military history that attack and surprise are the core of the principles of war. Moreover, in contemporary warfare

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS II: THE CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF "ON WAR"

While Clausewitz's influence has been so great to many people, he has received the highest respect and the highest criticism as well. Generally speaking, the former comes from continental tradition, impressed by his analysis on the nature of war and validity of mass mobilization; and the latter comes from insular tradition, interested in ethical premises of war.

As society makes progress, criticism of Clausewitz gets stronger. Liddell Hart, the creator of the grand strategy theory, would be the leader of those critics. He said, "Strategy has to reduce the fighting to the slenderest possible proportions."³⁹ Nickerson, an American author, complained that "from Clausewitz to Foch and Ludendorff military thinkers stubbornly identified the idea of war with that of the utmost violence."⁴⁰

The contemporary situation of nuclear stalemate is quite different from that of Clausewitz's theory. Limitless absolute war has lost its meaning, considering the present situation where both hostile superpowers have destructive power enough to exterminate mankind several times. This is a paradox of the nuclear age, which commands contemporary military strategy.⁴¹ As a result, while the past in which the threat of using weapons was a corridor to war, today the threat itself becomes a important factor. This is a Copernican revolution in contemporary military strategy.⁴²

For fear of total war, conventional warfare in these days has many restrictions such as topography, weaponry systems and the scopes of

testified that Clausewitz kept alive the conception of 'true war' within the Prussian Officer's Corps."³⁵ In 1933 the commander-in-chief of the new Wehrmacht, General Von Blomberg, declared; "In spite of the fundamental transformation of all technical modalities, Clausewitz's book "On War" remains for all time the basis for any rational development in the Art of War."³⁶ As such, Prussia and Germany remained under the influence of Clausewitz's thought.

In France during hostilities against Germany, excellent strategists including Foch-even though limitless, exhausting battles in Verdun and Somme struck great blows to Clausewitz's thoughts and strategists in World War II were fascinated with Clausewitz. The air strategy advocated by Douhet, Mitchell, and Seversky was also affected by Clausewitz. Douglas MacArthur, hero of the Incheon landing operation, was greatly influenced by Clausewitz. In short, as Captain Liddell Hart insisted, "the generals of the last-half-century became intoxicated with the blood-red wine of Clausewitzian growth."³⁷ Clausewitz's influence was overwhelming.

Clausewitz also affected such economists and politicians as List, Marx and Engels. In his remarks on Clausewitz's "On War", Lenin stressed, "Politics is the reason, and the war is only the tool; not the other way around",³⁸ quoting the famous axiom of Clausewitz-"war is but a continuation of politics by other means."

types of war was discussed seriously in Book One only; whereas the rest of the books were written only in the context of the absolute war. To be sure, there is a difference in treating the two concepts of war.

He said, "We do claim, however, that direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration. We simply want to establish this dominance of destructive principle."³⁰ "Battle is the bloodiest solution. While it should not simply be considered as mutual murder-its effect, as we shall see in the next chapter, is rather a killing of the enemy's spirit than of his men-it is always true that the character of battle, like its name, is slaughter, and its price is blood."³¹

He went on, "We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity."³²

For his particular style of description, the researchers of Clausewitz are hardly to blame for their insincerity and misunderstanding. Clausewitz's fame and the value of "On War", ironically speaking, is in part due to such misunderstandings. Even if "On War" was regarded by the Prussian Army as having provided the General Staff and Prussian Army with property and vitality.³³ But it was only after Sadowa and Sedan that "On War" became a classic in military studies throughout Europe.³⁴

Since then the analysis and estimation of Clausewitz's military theory, strategy and tactics spread all over the world. "Schlieffen

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS I: THE TRAP AND INFLUENCE OF 'ON WAR'

To criticize Clausewitz as a mere 'apostle of violence' and an incarnation of annihilation theory may have no proper foundation. In spite of that, he seems to have been "a foremost exponent of 'Prussianism', the 'battle-mania' of the nineteenth century"²⁷ and the godfather of the annihilation theory. Someone says that those students of Clausewitz" such as Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff, and their apostles and other researchers had studied Clausewitz without truly understanding him, and caused distortion of the writer's intentions.²⁸

In fact, some criticisms hold true. There are some problems in his work on war in terms of logical context and a unified system. Though he didn't admit it himself, his writing inclined to be enthusiastic military idealism rather than keen insight into the reality of war.

On the insufficiency of logical description, Clausewitz admits it to be an unfinished work. He explained his work in one note on his plans for revising 'On War' on July 1827, saying that it was "merely a rather formless mass that must be thoroughly reworked once more." He predicted, "If an early death should terminate my work, what I have written so far would, of course, only deserve to be called a shapeless mass of idea. Being liable to endless misinterpretation it would be the target of much halfbaked criticism."²⁹

Most readers used to be deeply impressed by his description of absolute war more than that of real war. His explanation of the two

a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character."²⁴

On the other hand, Clausewitz established the basic theory and concept on people's war which appears to be of great concern in these times in terms of types of war. In chapter 16, Book Six, 'The People in Arms', which he derived from Napoleon's campaigns in Spain and Russia, Clausewitz described fully the value of insurgent actions against foreign invaders.²⁵ Of course, Clausewitz's 'People's War' differs from that of contemporary revolutionary war; but he covered the basic theory of guerrilla warfare.

Another noteworthy feature of Clausewitz's thoughts is his emphasis of spiritual and psychological factors in war. He also spared several chapters in order to emphasize the spirit of war. To win victory, strength of force is important; whereas spiritual might plays a greater role. "One might say that the physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the morale factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade."²⁶ This phrase represents the most precious and everlasting elements in Clausewitz's thoughts.

them with the others in order to further the object of the war".²² One has been called tactics, and the other strategy... . According to our classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.

What Clausewitz emphasized in real war is the restrictive characteristics of war against the limitless violence rising from the absolute war. Annihilating enemy forces is not a final purpose. The purpose of real war is the "general point of direction"²³ for taking the initiative at the negotiating table. Clausewitz's thought on conceptional war is different from that of real war.

Now comes the problem of how to harmonize the two types of war; the absolute war, and the real war. From the Napoleonic war to World War II, the style of conducting war was controlled by the concept of absolute war, which required unconditional surrender. Since then, contemporary conflicts such as the Korean War and several Middle East Wars have been conducted as the means of politics.

Clausewitz suggests a conclusive concept on this. "The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its abstract concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy, the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less the military elements's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As

tendencies and aims shall not conflict with the peculiar nature of military means, and this demand is by no means a slight one...."¹⁷

In this case, contemporary values could be totally reversed. Military aims may precede political purposes. Due to its decisive character, battles also can be recognized as if a lever of war.

The concept of annihilation can be summarized 'extreme violence'.¹⁸ But this limitless pursuit is nothing but an ideal type of war. This 'war on paper' becomes otherwise-- due to the political situation, uncertain factors and accidental happenings on battle fields. Clausewitz described these factors as 'friction', which is an important point in distinguishing 'real war' from 'war on paper'.

Because of friction, war becomes restricted in various dimensions, reversing the relation between politics and war. That is, true war is never an isolated act and does not consist of a single short blow. For, in war, the result is never final; and the probabilities of real life replace the extremes and absolutes required by theory.¹⁹ "When whole communities go to war-whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples--the reason always due to some political object, war, therefore, is an act of policy."²⁰ "War is merely a continuation of politics by other means, and the political object is the final goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."²¹

"The conduct of war, then, consists in the planning and conduct of fighting. This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of

37. H. Rothfels, op. cit., p.93. He requoted from Liddell Hart, "The Ghost of Napoleon", (1933).
38. Anatol Rapoport, (ed. with an introduction), On War
39. H. Rothfels, op. cit., p.94. He requoted from Liddell Hart, "The Ghost of Napoleon," (1933).
40. H. Rothfels, ibid., p.93. He requoted from H. Nickerson, "The Armed Force," (1940).
41. Morton H. Halperin, Defense strategies for the seventies.
42. Y. Harkab, Nuclear war and Nuclear peace (Jerusalem: 1966), P.2.
43. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, op. cit., p.204.
44. Anatol Rapoport, op. cit., p.47.
45. Bernard Brodie, "The continuing relevance of war", op. cit., pp.56-57.
46. Anatol Rapoport, op. cit., p.62.

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